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&NT Domain Authentication
------------------------
Authors: - Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton ()
-------- - Paul Ashton
(paul@argo.demon.co.uk)
- Duncan Stansfield
Copyright (C) 1997 Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
Copyright (C) 1997 Paul Ashton
Copyright (C) 1997 Duncan Stansfield
Version: 0.024 (01Nov97)
Distribution: Unlimited and encouraged, for the purposes of implementation
------------- and comments.
Feedback welcomed by the authors.
Liability: Absolutely none accepted implicitly or explicitly, direct
---------- or consequentially, for use, abuse, misuse, lack of use,
misunderstandings, mistakes, omissions, mis-information for
anything in or not in, related to or not related to, or
pertaining to this document, or anything else that a lawyer
can think of or not think of.
Warning: Please bear in mind that an incorrect implementation of this
-------- protocol can cause NT workstation to fail irrevocably, for
which the authors accept no liability (see above).
contact your vendor if you have any problems.
Sources: - Packet Traces from Netmonitor (Service Pack 1 and above)
-------- - Paul Ashton and Luke Leighton's other "NT Domain" doc.
- CIFS documentation - cifs6.txt
- CIFS documentation - cifsrap2.txt
Original: /~lkcl/cifsntdomain.txt.
--------- (Controlled copy maintained by )
Credits: - Paul Ashton: loads of work with Net M
understanding the NT a
reference implementation of the NT domain support on which
this document is originally based.
- Duncan Stansfield: low-level analysis of MSRPC Pipes.
- Linus Nordberg: producing c-code from Paul's crypto spec.
- Windows Sourcer development team
1) Introduction
2) Structures and notes
2.1) Notes
2.3) Enumerations
2.3) Structures
3) Transact Named Pipe Header/Tail
3.1) MSRPC Pipes
3.2) Header
4) NTLSA Transact Named Pipe
4.1) LSA Open Policy
4.2) LSA Query Info Policy
4.3) LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains
4.4) LSA Open Secret
4.5) LSA Close
4.6) LSA Lookup SIDS
4.7) LSA Lookup Names
5) NETLOGON rpc Transact Named Pipe
5.1) LSA Request Challenge
5.2) LSA Authenticate 2
5.3) LSA Server Password Set
5.4) LSA SAM Logon
5.5) LSA SAM Logoff
6) //MAILSLOT/NET/NTLOGON
6.1) Query for PDC
6.2) SAM Logon
7) SRVSVC Transact Named Pipe
7.1) Net Share Enum
7.2) Net Server Get Info
A1) Cryptographic side of NT Domain Authentication
A1.1) Definitions
A1.2) Protocol
A1.3) Comments
A2) SIDs and RIDs
A2.1) Well-known SIDs
A2.1.1) Universal well-known SIDs
A2.1.2) NT well-known SIDs
A2.2) Well-known RIDS
A2.2.1) Well-known RID users
A2.2.2) Well-known RID groups
A2.2.3) Well-known RID aliases
1) Introduction
---------------
This document contains information to provide an NT workstation with login
services, without the need for an NT server.
It should be possible to select a domain instead of a workgroup (in the NT
workstation's TCP/IP settings) and after the obligatory reboot, type in a
username, password, select a domain and successfully log in.
appreciate any feedback on your experiences with this process, and any
comments, corrections and additions to this document.
The packets described here can be easily derived from (and are probably
better understood using) Netmon.exe.
You will need to use the version
of Netmon that matches your system, in order to correctly decode the
NETLOGON, lsarpc and srvsvc Transact pipes.
This document is derived from
NT Service Pack 1 and its corresponding version of Netmon.
It is intended
that an annotated packet trace be produced, which will likely be more
instructive than this document.
Also needed, to fully implement NT Domain Login Services, is the
document describing the cryptographic part of the NT authentication.
This document is available from comp.protocols. from the ntsecurity.net
digest and from the samba digest, amongst other sources.
A copy is available from:
http://ntbugtraq.rc.on.ca/SCRIPTS/WA.EXE?A2=ind9708&L=ntbugtraq&O=A&P=2935
/~lkcl/crypt.html
A c-code implementation, provided by Linus Nordberg &linus@incolumitas.se&
of this protocol is available from:
http://samba.anu.edu.au/cgi-bin/mfs/01/digest/1997/97aug/0391.html
/~lkcl/crypt.txt
Also used to provide debugging information is the Check Build version of
NT workstation, and enabling full debugging in NETLOGON.
achieved by setting the following REG_SZ registry key to 0x1ffffff:
HKLM/SYSTEM/CurrentControlSet/Services/Netlogon/Parameters
- Incorrect direct editing of the registry can cause your machine to fail.
Then again, so can incorrect implementation of this protocol.
See "Liability:" above.
Bear in mind that each packet over-the-wire will have its origin in an
Therefore, there are likely to be structures, enumerations
and defines that are usefully documented elsewhere.
This document is by no means complete or authoritative.
Missing sections
include, but are not limited to:
- the meaning (and use by NT) of SIDs and RIDs.
- mappings of RIDs to usernames (and vice-versa).
- what a User ID is and what a Group ID is.
- the exact meaning/definition of various magic constants or enumerations.
- the reply error code and use of that error code when a workstation
becomes a member of a domain (to be described later).
Failure to
return this error code will make the workstation report that it is
already a member of the domain.
- the cryptographic side of the NetrServerPasswordSet command, which would
allow the workstation to change its password.
This password is used to
generate the long-term session key.
[It is possible to reject this
command, and keep the default workstation password].
2) Notes and Structures
-----------------------
2.1) Notes
----------
- In the SMB Transact pipes, some "Structures", described here, appear to be
4-byte aligned with the SMB header, at their start.
Exactly which
"Structures" need aligning is not precisely known or documented.
- In the UDP NTLOGON Mailslots, some "Structures", described here, appear to be
2-byte aligned with the start of the mailslot, at their start.
- Domain SID is of the format S-revision-version-auth1-auth2...authN.
e.g S-1-5-123-456-789-123-456.
the 5 could be a sub-revision.
- any undocumented buffer pointers must be non-zero if the string buffer it
refers to contains characters.
exactly what value they should be is unknown.
0x seems to do the trick to indicate that the buffer exists.
NULL buffer pointer indicates that the string buffer is of zero length.
If the buffer pointer is NULL, then it is suspected that the structure it
refers to is NOT put into (or taken out of) the SMB data stream.
empirically derived from, for example, the LSA SAM Logon response packet,
where if the buffer pointer is NULL, the user information is not inserted
into the data stream.
Exactly what happens with an array of buffer pointers
is not known, although an educated guess can be made.
- an array of structures (a container) appears to have a count and a pointer.
if the count is zero, the pointer is also zero.
no further data is put
into or taken out of the SMB data stream.
if the count is non-zero, then
the pointer is also non-zero.
immediately following the pointer is the
count again, followed by an array of container sub-structures.
appears a third time after the last sub-structure.
2.2) Enumerations
-----------------
- MSRPC Header type.
command number in the msrpc packet header
MSRPC_Request:
MSRPC_Response:
MSRPC_Bind:
MSRPC_BindAck:
- MSRPC Packet info.
the meaning of these flags is undocumented
FirstFrag:
RecRespond:
NoMultiplex:
NotForIdemp:
NotforBcast:
2.3) Structures
---------------
- sizeof VOID* is 32 bits.
- sizeof char is 8 bits.
- UTIME is 32 bits, indicating time in seconds since 01jan1970.
documented
in cifs6.txt (section 3.5 page, page 30).
- NTTIME is 64 bits.
documented in cifs6.txt (section 3.5 page, page 30).
- DOM_SID (domain SID structure) :
num of sub-authorities in domain SID
SID revision number
num of sub-authorities in domain SID
6 bytes for domain SID - Identifier Authority.
UINT16[n_subauths] domain SID sub-authorities
Note: the domain SID is documented elsewhere.
- STR (string) :
null-terminated string of ascii characters.
- UNIHDR (unicode string header) :
length of unicode string
max length of unicode string
4 - undocumented.
- UNIHDR2 (unicode string header plus buffer pointer) :
unicode string header
undocumented buffer pointer
- UNISTR (unicode string) :
null-terminated string of unicode characters.
- NAME (length-indicated unicode string) :
length of unicode string
null-terminated string of unicode characters.
- UNISTR2 (aligned unicode string) :
padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned
with the start of the SMB header.
max length of unicode string
0 - undocumented
length of unicode string
string of uncode characters.
- OBJ_ATTR (object attributes) :
0x18 - length (in bytes) including the length field.
0 - root directory (pointer)
0 - object name (pointer)
0 - attributes (undocumented)
0 - security descriptior (pointer)
0 - security quality of service
- POL_HND (LSA policy handle) :
policy handle
- DOM_SID2 (domain SID structure, SIDS stored in unicode) :
5 - SID type
0 - undocumented
domain SID unicode string header
domain SID unicode string
Note: there is a conflict between the unicode string header and the
unicode string itself as to which to use to indicate string
this will need to be resolved.
Note: the SID type indicates, for example, a well-known group etc.
this is documented somewhere.
- DOM_RID (domain RID structure) :
5 - well-known SID.
1 - user SID (see ShowACLs)
5 - undocumented
domain RID
0 - domain index out of above reference domains
- LOG_INFO (server, account, client structure) :
Note: logon server name starts with two '/' characters and is upper case.
Note: account name is the logon client name from the LSA Request Challenge,
with a $ on the end of it, in upper case.
undocumented buffer pointer
logon server unicode string
account name unicode string
sec_chan - security channel type
logon client machine unicode string
- CLNT_SRV (server, client names structure) :
Note: logon server name starts with two '/' characters and is upper case.
undocumented buffer pointer
logon server unicode string
undocumented buffer pointer
logon client machine unicode string
- CREDS (credentials + time stamp)
credentials
time stamp
- CLNT_INFO2 (server, client structure, client credentials) :
Note: whenever this structure appears in a request, you must take a copy
of the client-calculated credentials received, because they will be
used in subsequent credential checks.
the presumed intention is to
maintain an authenticated request/response trail.
client and server names
???? padding, for 4-byte alignment with SMB header.
pointer to client credentials.
client-calculated credentials + client time
- CLNT_INFO (server, account, client structure, client credentials) :
Note: whenever this structure appears in a request, you must take a copy
of the client-calculated credentials received, because they will be
used in subsequent credential checks.
the presumed intention is to
maintain an authenticated request/response trail.
logon account info
client-calculated credentials + client time
- ID_INFO_1 (id info structure, auth level 1) :
ptr_id_info_1
domain name unicode header
param control
user name unicode header
workgroup name unicode header
rc4 LM OWF Password
rc4 NT OWF Password
domain name unicode string
user name unicode string
workstation name unicode string
- SAM_INFO (sam logon/logoff id info structure) :
Note: presumably, the return credentials is supposedly for the server to
verify that the credential chain hasn't been compromised.
CLNT_INFO2
client identification/authentication info
pointer to return credentials.
return credentials - ignored.
logon level
switch value
switch (switch_value)
id_info_1;
- GID (group id info) :
user attributes (only used by NT 3.1 and 3.51)
- DOM_REF (domain reference info) :
undocumented buffer pointer.
num referenced domains?
undocumented domain name buffer pointer.
32 - max number of entries
4 - num referenced domains?
domain name unicode string header
UNIHDR2[num_ref_doms-1]
referenced domain unicode string headers
domain name unicode string
DOM_SID[num_ref_doms]
referenced domain SIDs
- DOM_INFO (domain info, levels 3 and 5 are the same)) :
??? padding to get 4-byte alignment with start of SMB header
domain name string length * 2
domain name string length * 2
undocumented domain name string buffer pointer
undocumented domain SID string buffer pointer
domain name (unicode string)
domain SID
- USER_INFO (user logon info) :
Note: it would be nice to know what the 16 byte user session key is for.
logon time
logoff time
kickoff time
password last set time
password can change time
password must change time
username unicode string header
user's full name unicode string header
logon script unicode string header
profile path unicode string header
home directory unicode string header
home directory drive unicode string header
logon count
bad password count
num groups
undocumented buffer pointer to groups.
user flags
user session key
logon server unicode string header
logon domain unicode string header
undocumented logon domain id pointer
40 undocumented padding bytes.
future expansion?
0 - num_other_sids?
NULL - undocumented pointer to other domain SIDs.
username unicode string
user's full name unicode string
logon script unicode string
profile path unicode string
home directory unicode string
home directory drive unicode string
num groups
GID[num_groups]
group info
logon server unicode string
logon domain unicode string
domain SID
DOM_SID[num_sids] other domain SIDs?
- SH_INFO_1_PTR (pointers to level 1 share info strings):
Note: see cifsrap2.txt section5, page 10.
0 for shi1_type indicates a
1 for shi1_type indicates a
Print Queue.
2 for shi1_type indicates a
3 for shi1_type indicates an IPC pipe.
0x (top bit set in shi1_type) indicates a hidden share.
shi1_netname - pointer to net name
- type of share.
0 - undocumented.
shi1_remark
- pointer to comment.
- SH_INFO_1_STR (level 1 share info strings) :
shi1_netname - unicode string of net name
shi1_remark
- unicode string of comment.
- SHARE_INFO_1_CTR :
share container with 0 entries:
0 - EntriesRead
0 - Buffer
share container with & 0 entries:
EntriesRead
non-zero - Buffer
EntriesRead
SH_INFO_1_PTR[EntriesRead]
share entry pointers
SH_INFO_1_STR[EntriesRead]
share entry strings
padding to get unicode string 4-byte
aligned with start of the SMB header.
EntriesRead
0 - padding
- SERVER_INFO_101 :
Note: see cifs6.txt section 6.4 - the fields described therein will be
of assistance here.
for example, the type listed below is the
same as fServerType, which is described in 6.4.1.
SV_TYPE_WORKSTATION
All workstations
SV_TYPE_SERVER
All servers
SV_TYPE_SQLSERVER
Any server running with SQL
SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_CTRL
Primary domain controller
SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_BAKCTRL
Backup domain controller
SV_TYPE_TIME_SOURCE
Server running the timesource
SV_TYPE_AFP
Apple File Protocol servers
SV_TYPE_NOVELL
Novell servers
SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_MEMBER
Domain Member
SV_TYPE_PRINTQ_SERVER
Server sharing print queue
SV_TYPE_DIALIN_SERVER
Server running dialin service.
SV_TYPE_XENIX_SERVER
Xenix server
SV_TYPE_NT
SV_TYPE_WFW
Server running Windows for
SV_TYPE_SERVER_NT
Windows NT non DC server
SV_TYPE_POTENTIAL_BROWSER
Server that can run the browser
SV_TYPE_BACKUP_BROWSER
Backup browser server
SV_TYPE_MASTER_BROWSER
Master browser server
SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_MASTER
Domain Master Browser server
SV_TYPE_LOCAL_LIST_ONLY
Enumerate only entries marked
SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_ENUM
Enumerate Domains. The pszServer
and pszDomain parameters must be
500 - platform_id
pointer to name
5 - major version
4 - minor version
type (SV_TYPE_... bit field)
pointer to comment
sv101_name - unicode string of server name
sv_101_comment
- unicode string of server comment.
padding to get unicode string 4-byte
aligned with start of the SMB header.
3) MSRPC over Transact Named Pipe
---------------------------------
For details on the SMB Transact Named Pipe, see cifs6.txt
3.1) MSRPC Pipes
----------------
The MSRPC is conducted over an SMB Transact Pipe with a name of "/PIPE/".
You must first obtain a 16 bit file handle, by sending a SMBopenX with the
pipe name "/PIPE/srvsvc" for example.
You can then perform an SMB Trans,
and must carry out an SMBclose on the file handle once you are finished.
Trans Requests must be sent with two setup UINT16s, no UINT16 params (none
known about), and UINT8 data parameters sufficient to contain the MSRPC
header, and MSRPC data.
The first UINT16 setup parameter must be either
0x0026 to indicate an RPC, or 0x0001 to indicate Set Named Pipe Handle
The second UINT16 parameter must be the file handle for the pipe,
obtained above.
The Data section for an API Command of 0x0026 (RPC pipe) in the Trans
Request is the RPC Header, followed by the RPC Data.
The Data section for
an API Command of 0x0001 (Set Named Pipe Handle state) is two bytes.
only value seen for these two bytes is 0x00 0x43.
MSRPC Responses are sent as response data inside standard SMB Trans
responses, with the MSRPC Header, MSRPC Data and MSRPC tail.
It is suspected that the Trans Requests will need to be at least 2-byte
aligned (probably 4-byte).
This is standard practice for SMBs.
It is also
independent of the observed 4-byte alignments with the start of the MSRPC
header, including the 4-byte alignment between the MSRPC header and the
MSRPC data.
First, an SMBtconX connection is made to the IPC$ share.
The connection
must be made using encrypted passwords, not clear-text.
Then, an SMBopenX
is made on the pipe.
Then, a Set Named Pipe Handle State must be sent,
after which the pipe is ready to accept API commands.
Lastly, and SMBclose
To be resolved:
lkcl/01nov97 there appear to be two additional bytes after the null-
terminated /PIPE/ name for the RPC pipe.
Values seen so far are
listed below:
initial SMBopenX request:
RPC API command 0x26 params:
"//PIPE//lsarpc"
0x65 0x63; 0x72 0x70; 0x44 0x65;
"//PIPE//srvsvc"
0x73 0x76; 0x4E 0x00; 0x5C 0x43;
3.2) Header
-----------
[section to be rewritten, following receipt of work by Duncan Stansfield]
Interesting note: if you set packed data representation to 0x
then all 4-byte and 2-byte word ordering is turned around!
The start of each of the NTLSA and NETLOGON named pipes begins with:
5 - RPC major version
0 - RPC minor version
2 - RPC response packet
3 - (FirstFrag bit-wise or with LastFrag)
0x - packed data representation
fragment length - data size (bytes) inc header and tail.
0 - authentication length
call identifier.
matches 12th UINT32 of incoming RPC data.
allocation hint - data size (bytes) minus header and tail.
0 - presentation context identifier
0 - cancel count
in replies: 0 - in requests: opnum - see #defines.
start of data (goes on for allocation_hint bytes)
RPC_Packet for request, response, bind and bind acknowledgement.
UINT8 versionmaj
# reply same as request (0x05)
UINT8 versionmin
# reply same as request (0x00)
UINT8 type
# one of the MSRPC_Type enums
UINT8 flags
# reply same as request (0x00 for Bind, 0x03 for Request)
UINT32 representation
# reply same as request (0x)
UINT16 fraglength
# the length of the data section of the SMB trans packet
UINT16 authlength
UINT32 callid
# call identifier. (e.g. 0x)
* stub USE TvPacket
# the remainder of the packet depending on the "type"
# the interfaces are numbered. as yet I haven't seen more than one interface
# used on the same pipe name
abstract (0x4B324FC8, 0x01D3AE16EBF, 0x)
transfer (0x8A885D04, 0x11C91CEB, 0x0008E89F, 0x6048102B, 0x)
RPC_Iface RW
UINT8 byte[16]
# 16 bytes of number
UINT32 version
# the interface number
# the remainder of the packet after the header if "type" was Bind
# in the response header, "type" should be BindAck
RPC_ReqBind RW
UINT16 maxtsize
# maximum transmission fragment size (0x1630)
UINT16 maxrsize
# max receive fragment size (0x1630)
UINT32 assocgid
# associated group id (0x0)
UINT32 numelements
# the number of elements (0x1)
UINT16 contextid
# presentation context identifier (0x0)
UINT8 numsyntaxes
# the number of syntaxes (has always been 1?)(0x1)
# 4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header
* abstractint USE RPC_Iface # num and vers. of interface client is using
* transferint USE RPC_Iface # num and vers. of interface to use for replies
RPC_Address RW
UINT16 length
# length of the string including null terminator
* port USE string
# the string above in single byte, null terminated form
# the response to place after the header in the reply packet
RPC_ResBind RW
UINT16 maxtsize
# same as request
UINT16 maxrsize
# same as request
UINT32 assocgid
* secondaddr USE RPC_Address
# the address string, as described earlier
# 4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header
UINT8 numresults
# the number of results (0x01)
# 4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header
UINT16 result
# result (0x00 = accept)
UINT16 reason
# reason (0x00 = no reason specified)
* transfersyntax USE RPC_Iface
# the transfer syntax from the request
# the remainder of the packet after the header for every other other
RPC_ReqNorm RW
UINT32 allochint
# the size of the stub data in bytes
UINT16 prescontext
# presentation context identifier (0x0)
UINT16 opnum
# operation number (0x15)
* stub USE TvPacket
# a packet dependent on the pipe name
# (probably the interface) and the op number)
# response to a request
RPC_ResNorm RW
UINT32 allochint
# size of the stub data in bytes
UINT16 prescontext
# presentation context identifier (same as request)
UINT8 cancelcount
# cancel count? (0x0)
UINT8 reserved
# 0 - one byte padding
* stub USE TvPacket
# the remainder of the reply
The end of each of the NTLSA and NETLOGON named pipes ends with:
end of data
return code
3.4 RPC Bind / Bind Ack
-----------------------
RPC Binds are the process of associating an RPC pipe (e.g /PIPE/lsarpc)
with a "transfer syntax" (see RPC_Iface structure).
The purpose for doing
this is unknown.
Note: The RPC_ResBind SMB Transact request is sent with two uint16 setup
parameters.
The first is 0x0026; the second is the file handle
returned by the SMBopenX Transact response.
Note: The RPC_ResBind members maxtsize, maxrsize and assocgid are the
same in the response as the same members in the RPC_ReqBind.
RPC_ResBind member transfersyntax is the same in the response as
Note: The RPC_ResBind response member secondaddr contains the name
of what is presumed to be the service behind the RPC pipe.
mapping identified so far is:
initial SMBopenX request:
RPC_ResBind response:
"//PIPE//srvsvc"
"//PIPE//ntsvcs"
"//PIPE//samr"
"//PIPE//lsass"
"//PIPE//lsarpc"
"//PIPE//lsass"
"//PIPE//wkssvc"
"//PIPE//wksvcs"
"//PIPE//NETLOGON"
"//PIPE//NETLOGON"
Note: The RPC_Packet fraglength member in both the Bind Request and Bind
Acknowledgment must contain the length of the entire RPC data,
including the RPC_Packet header.
RPC_Packet
RPC_ReqBind
RPC_Packet
RPC_ResBind
4) NTLSA Transact Named Pipe
----------------------------
The sequence of actions taken on this pipe are:
- Establish a connection to the IPC$ share (SMBtconX).
use encrypted passwords.
- Open an RPC Pipe with the name "//PIPE//lsarpc".
Store the file handle.
- Using the file handle, send a Set Named Pipe Handle state to 0x4300.
- Send an LSA Open Policy request.
Store the Policy Handle.
- Using the Policy Handle, send LSA Query Info Policy requests, etc.
- Using the Policy Handle, send an LSA Close.
- Close the IPC$ share.
Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are:
- LSA Open Policy:
- LSA Query Info Policy:
- LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains: 0x0d
- LSA Open Secret:
- LSA Lookup SIDs:
- LSA Lookup Names:
- LSA Close:
4.1) LSA Open Policy
--------------------
Note: The policy handle can be anything you like.
buffer pointer
server name - unicode string starting with two '/'s
object attributes
1 - desired access
LSA policy handle
0 - indicates success
4.2) LSA Query Info Policy
--------------------------
Note: The info class in response must be the same as that in the request.
LSA policy handle
info class (also a policy handle?)
undocumented buffer pointer
info class (same as info class in request).
switch (info class)
DOM_INFO domain info, levels 3 and 5 (are the same).
0 - indicates success
4.3) LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains
----------------------------------
no extra data
0 - enumeration context
0 - entries read
0 - trust information
0xa - "no trusted domains" success code
4.4) LSA Open Secret
--------------------
no extra data
0 - undocumented
0 - undocumented
0 - undocumented
0 - undocumented
0 - undocumented
0x0C00 0034 - "no such secret" success code
4.5) LSA Close
--------------
policy handle to be closed
0s - closed policy handle (all zeros)
0 - indicates success
4.6) LSA Lookup SIDS
--------------------
Note: num_entries in response must be same as num_entries in request.
LSA policy handle
num_entries
undocumented domain SID buffer pointer
undocumented domain name buffer pointer
VOID*[num_entries] undocumented domain SID pointers to be looked up.
DOM_SID[num_entries] domain SIDs to be looked up.
completely undocumented 16 bytes.
domain reference response
num_entries (listed above)
undocumented buffer pointer
num_entries (listed above)
DOM_SID2[num_entries] domain SIDs (from Request, listed above).
num_entries (listed above)
0 - indicates success
4.7) LSA Lookup Names
---------------------
Note: num_entries in response must be same as num_entries in request.
LSA policy handle
num_entries
num_entries
undocumented domain SID buffer pointer
undocumented domain name buffer pointer
NAME[num_entries]
names to be looked up.
undocumented bytes - falsely translated SID structure?
domain reference response
num_entries (listed above)
undocumented buffer pointer
num_entries (listed above)
DOM_RID[num_entries]
domain SIDs (from Request, listed above).
num_entries (listed above)
0 - indicates success
5) NETLOGON rpc Transact Named Pipe
-----------------------------------
The sequence of actions taken on this pipe are:
- Establish a connection to the IPC$ share (SMBtconX).
use encrypted passwords.
- Open an RPC Pipe with the name "//PIPE//NETLOGON".
Store the file handle.
- Using the file handle, send a Set Named Pipe Handle state to 0x4300.
- Create Client Challenge. Send LSA Request Challenge.
Store Server Challenge.
- Calculate Session Key.
Send an LSA Auth 2 Challenge.
Store Auth2 Challenge.
- Calc/Verify Client Creds.
Send LSA Srv PW Set.
Calc/Verify Server Creds.
- Calc/Verify Client Creds.
Send LSA SAM Logon .
Calc/Verify Server Creds.
- Calc/Verify Client Creds.
Send LSA SAM Logoff.
Calc/Verify Server Creds.
- Close the IPC$ share.
Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are:
- LSA Request Challenge:
- LSA Server Password Set:
- LSA SAM Logon:
- LSA SAM Logoff:
- LSA Auth 2:
- LSA Logon Control:
5.1) LSA Request Challenge
--------------------------
Note: logon server name starts with two '/' characters and is upper case.
Note: logon client is the machine, not the user.
Note: the initial LanManager password hash, against which the challenge
is issued, is the machine name itself (lower case).
there will be
calls issued (LSA Server Password Set) which will change this, later.
refusing these calls allows you to always deal with the same password
(i.e the LM# of the machine name in lower case).
undocumented buffer pointer
logon server unicode string
logon client unicode string
client challenge
server challenge
0 - indicates success
5.2) LSA Authenticate 2
-----------------------
Note: in between request and response, calculate the client credentials,
and check them against the client-calculated credentials (this
process uses the previously received client credentials).
Note: neg_flags in the response is the same as that in the request.
Note: you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received
here, because they will be used in subsequent authentication packets.
client identification info
client-calculated credentials
padding to 4-byte align with start of SMB header.
neg_flags - negotiated flags (usual value is 0x0000 01ff)
server credentials.
neg_flags - same as neg_flags in request.
0 - indicates success.
failure value unknown.
5.3) LSA Server Password Set
----------------------------
Note: the new password is suspected to be a DES encryption using the old
password to generate the key.
Note: in between request and response, calculate the client credentials,
and check them against the client-calculated credentials (this
process uses the previously received client credentials).
Note: the server credentials are constructed from the client-calculated
credentials and the client time + 1 second.
Note: you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received
here, because they will be used in subsequent authentication packets.
client identification/authentication info
new password - undocumented.
server credentials.
server time stamp appears to be ignored.
0 - 0xC000 006a indicates failure
5.4) LSA SAM Logon
------------------
Note: valid_user is True iff the username and password hash are valid for
the requested domain.
sam_id structure
undocumented buffer pointer
server credentials.
server time stamp appears to be ignored.
if (valid_user)
3 - switch value indicating USER_INFO structure.
non-zero - pointer to USER_INFO structure
USER_INFO user logon information
1 - Au 0 - Non-Auth?
0 - indicates success
0 - switch value.
value to indicate no user presumed.
0x - indicates no USER_INFO structure.
1 - Au 0 - Non-Auth?
0xC000 0064 - NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER.
5.5) LSA SAM Logoff
--------------------
Note: presumably, the SAM_INFO structure is validated, and a (currently
undocumented) error code returned if the Logoff is invalid.
sam_id structure
undocumented buffer pointer
server credentials.
server time stamp appears to be ignored.
0 - indicates success.
undocumented failure indication.
6) //MAILSLOT/NET/NTLOGON
-------------------------
Note: mailslots will contain a response mailslot, to which the response
should be sent.
the target NetBIOS name is REQUEST_NAME&20&, where
REQUEST_NAME is the name of the machine that sent the request.
6.1) Query for PDC
------------------
Note: NTversion, LMNTtoken, LM20token in response are the same as those
given in the request.
0x0007 - Query for PDC
machine name
response mailslot
padding to 2-byte align with start of mailslot.
machine name
0x000A - Respose to Query for PDC
machine name (in uppercase)
padding to 2-byte align with start of mailslot.
machine name
domain name
NTversion (same as received in request)
LMNTtoken (same as received in request)
LM20token (same as received in request)
6.2) SAM Logon
--------------
Note: machine name in response is preceded by two '/' characters.
Note: NTversion, LMNTtoken, LM20token in response are the same as those
given in the request.
Note: user name in the response is presumably the same as that in the request.
0x0012 - SAM Logon
request count
machine name
response mailslot
alloweable account
domain SID size
char[sid_size] domain SID, of sid_size bytes.
???? padding to 4? 2? -byte align with start of mailslot.
0x0013 - Response to SAM Logon
machine name
user name - workstation trust account
domain name
7) SRVSVC Transact Named Pipe
-----------------------------
Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are:
- Net Share Enum :
- Net Server Get Info :
7.1) Net Share Enum
------------------
Note: share level and switch value in the response are presumably the
same as those in the request.
Note: cifsrap2.txt (section 5) may be of limited assistance here.
pointer (to server name?)
server name
padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned
with the start of the SMB header.
share level
switch value
pointer to SHARE_INFO_1_CTR
SHARE_INFO_1_CTR
share info with 0 entries
preferred maximum length (0xffff ffff)
share level
switch value
pointer to SHARE_INFO_1_CTR
SHARE_INFO_1_CTR
share info (only added if share info ptr is non-zero)
0 - indicates success
7.2) Net Server Get Info
------------------
Note: level is the same value as in the request.
server name
switch level
switch level
pointer to SERVER_INFO_101
SERVER_INFO_101
server info (only added if server info ptr is non-zero)
0 - indicates success
A1) Cryptographic side of NT Domain Authentication
--------------------------------------------------
A1.1) Definitions
-----------------
Add(A1,A2): Intel byte ordered addition of corresponding 4 byte words
in arrays A1 and A2
E(K,D): DES ECB encryption of 8 byte data D using 7 byte key K
lmowf(): Lan man hash
ntowf(): NT hash
PW: md4(machine_password) == md4(lsadump $machine.acc) ==
pwdump(machine$) (initially) == md4(lmowf(unicode(machine)))
RC4(K,Lk,D,Ld): RC4 encryption of data D of length Ld with key K of
v[m..n(,l)]: subset of v from bytes m to n, optionally padded with
zeroes to length l
Cred(K,D): E(K[7..7,7],E(K[0..6],D)) computes a credential
Time(): 4 byte current time
Cc,Cs: 8 byte client and server challenges Rc,Rs: 8 byte client and
server credentials
A1.2) Protocol
--------------
C-&S ReqChal,Cc S-&C Cs
C & S compute session key Ks = E(PW[9..15],E(PW[0..6],Add(Cc,Cs)))
C: Rc = Cred(Ks,Cc) C-&S Authenticate,Rc S: Rs = Cred(Ks,Cs),
assert(Rc == Cred(Ks,Cc)) S-&C Rs C: assert(Rs == Cred(Ks,Cs))
On joining the domain the client will optionally attempt to change its
password and the domain controller may refuse to update it depending
on registry settings. This will also occur weekly afterwards.
C: Tc = Time(), Rc' = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc) C-&S ServerPasswordSet,Rc',Tc,
rc4(Ks[0..7,16],lmowf(randompassword()) C: Rc = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc+1) S:
assert(Rc' == Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc)), Ts = Time() S: Rs' = Cred(Ks,Rs+Tc+1)
S-&C Rs',Ts C: assert(Rs' == Cred(Ks,Rs+Tc+1)) S: Rs = Rs'
User: U with password P wishes to login to the domain (incidental data
such as workstation and domain omitted)
C: Tc = Time(), Rc' = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc) C-&S NetLogonSamLogon,Rc',Tc,U,
rc4(Ks[0..7,16],16,ntowf(P),16), rc4(Ks[0..7,16],16,lmowf(P),16) S:
assert(Rc' == Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc)) assert(passwords match those in SAM) S:
Ts = Time()
S-&C Cred(Ks,Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc+1)),userinfo(logon script,UID,SIDs,etc) C:
assert(Rs == Cred(Ks,Cred(Rc+Tc+1)) C: Rc = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc+1)
A1.3) Comments
--------------
On first joining the domain the session key could be computed by
anyone listening in on the network as the machine password has a well
known value. Until the machine is rebooted it will use this session
key to encrypt NT and LM one way functions of passwords which are
password equivalents. Any user who logs in before the machine has been
rebooted a second time will have their password equivalent exposed. Of
course the new machine password is exposed at this time anyway.
None of the returned user info such as logon script, profile path and
SIDs *appear* to be protected by anything other than the TCP checksum.
The server time stamps appear to be ignored.
The client sends a ReturnAuthenticator in the SamLogon request which I
can't find a use for.
However its time is used as the timestamp
returned by the server.
The password OWFs should NOT be sent over the network reversibly
encrypted. They should be sent using RC4(Ks,md4(owf)) with the server
computing the same function using the owf values in the SAM.
A2) SIDs and RIDs
-----------------
SIDs and RIDs are well documented elsewhere.
A SID is an NT Security ID (see DOM_SID structure).
They are of the form:
S-revision-NN-SubAuth1-SubAuth2-SubAuth3...
S-revision-0xNNNNNNNNNNNN-SubAuth1-SubAuth2-SubAuth3...
currently, the SID revision is 1.
The Sub-Authorities are known as Relative IDs (RIDs).
A2.1) Well-known SIDs
---------------------
A2.1.1) Universal well-known SIDs
---------------------------------
Creator Owner ID
Creator Group ID
Creator Owner Server ID
Creator Group Server ID
(Non-unique IDs)
A2.1.2) NT well-known SIDs
--------------------------
NT Authority
Interactive
AnonymousLogon
(aka null logon session)
ServerLogon
(aka domain controller account)
(Logon IDs)
S-1-5-5-X-Y
(NT non-unique IDs)
S-1-5-0x15-...
(Built-in domain)
s-1-5-0x20
A2.2) Well-known RIDS
---------------------
A RID is a sub-authority value, as part of either a SID, or in the case
of Group RIDs, part of the DOM_GID structure, in the USER_INFO_1
structure, in the LSA SAM Logon response.
A2.2.1) Well-known RID users
----------------------------
DOMAIN_USER_RID_ADMIN
DOMAIN_USER_RID_GUEST
A2.2.2) Well-known RID groups
----------------------------
DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_ADMINS
DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_USERS
DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_GUESTS
A2.2.3) Well-known RID aliases
------------------------------
DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS
DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_USERS
DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_GUESTS
DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_POWER_USERS
DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ACCOUNT_OPS
DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_SYSTEM_OPS
DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_PRINT_OPS
DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_BACKUP_OPS
DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_REPLICATOR
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